Cyclone Nargis in Burma: Aid Analysis

Cyclone Nargis in Burma upkeep AnalysisIntroductionOn May 2nd 2008 a grade 3 cyclone hit the Irrawaddy delta in Southern Myanmar. Nargis, as it was named, was the worst inborn disaster in Myanmars recorded history (TCG 2008). It ended up claiming the lives of more or less 140,000 people in addition to displacing a advertize 800,000. The United Nations describe that boilersuit the cyclone had disrupted the lives of near 2.4 million people (Crisis Group 2008).The Myanmar govern ment, or the State nourishion and Democracy Council (SPDC), had neither the resources nor the bewilder to deal with much(prenominal) an event and as a result, care from the external club was demand (Selth 2008). The purpose of this paper is to examine the encourage delivered to Myanmar by various worldwide government and civil society groups. In an tackle to do so the paper looks at the at delivery of the avail in faint-hearted of the influence of interlanded estateal authorities, the muni cipal policies select by the SPDC, external financing fields, the effectiveness of the human rights musical arrangement, and issues related culture, environment and sexual urge.Influence of International government activityOne of the occurrenceors that had a signifi kindlet impact on the delivery of precaution to the cyclone victims was the influence international politics on the decision making process. This atom of the paper retorts a look at the manner in which politics determined the course of the humanitarian operating room in Myanmar. head start of all, it is of size satiscircumstanceoryness to highlight the fact that for twenty years before Nargis struck the Irrawaddy delta, Myanmar had been divest of international forethought. The international community hoped that by enforcing sanctions and trade embargos they would be qualified to force the military regime out of political power and pack in a more democratic government. The devastating consequence of cyclon e Nargis, however, make the international governments and non government organizations realize that they had to suspend those polices temporarily in an attempt to run the much necessitate humanitarian assistant to the victims. (Crisis Group 2008)Unfortunately, for several(prenominal) weeks the SPDC continued to hinder the international humanitarian operation. They insisted upon delivering support themselves with as pocketable help from overseas as possible. They blocked approach to the affected piece and ref us antique to grant visas to international concern workers (Selth 2008). They also prevented French, UK and US attend to vessels from entryway Myanmar territory. Despite the fact that these ships were carrying supplies to feed and shelter the survivors, the military junta feargond that the humanitarian operation could be used as a pretense to overthrow their government. wherefore the tutelage vessels, which the SPDC viewed as warships, were left anchored in internati onal waters for weeks awaiting con displace to unload the much need supplies, before they went back. (Stover and Vinck 2008)This pattern of events prompted several European countries to view the SPDCs response to the disaster as a crime a additionst humanity. They impeach the SPDC of having had inadequate aid measures in place and its continued rejection of aid from oversea was considered to be a deliberate disregard for the citizens of Myanmar (Crisis Group 2008). Therefore, the French government, with the subscribe of the British and US governments, requested the UN Security Council to authorize the Responsibility to Protect teaching for the purpose of delivering aid to the victims by force if necessary (Belanger and Horsey 2008). However, Chinese and Russian governments rejected the proposal based on the fact that the doctrine did not apply to inwrought disasters and as a result was not sanctioned by the Security Council (Selth 2008).Eventually signs of cooperation between the SPDC and the international community began to emerge. First there was a meeting between the Foreign Ministers of the members of the connectedness of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), where it was established that aid could be delivered to the percentage finished ASEAN representatives. Next, at a meeting between UN Secretary- public Ban Ki-moon and Senior General Than Shwe in Naypyitaw it was agreed that the SPDC would al low international aid workers full access to the disaster sites. As an outcome of these two meetings the SPDC along with representative from the UN and ASEAN bunch up the Tripartite Core Group (TCG), as a center to coordinate the cooperative relief effort. (ALTSEAN 2008)Domestic PoliciesEven later granting visas to the aid workers, the SPDC implemented certain domestic policies that hindered the international relief effort. An example of such a deterring policy is the confinement of international aid workers to the immediate Yangon area. As a result of thi s policy, foreign staff members distributing relief materials and food donated by the international community could allow ford work from Yangon region. They had to rely on the junta to distribute it outside the city borders. In addition, the junta also destiny up road blocks preventing access to the affected areas in an attempt to further restrict the movements of international aid workers. (ALTSEAN 2008)Additionally the SPDC was cautious of the types of materials they allowed to be brought in as aid. They prevented aid agencies from delivering any materials that could be used by the survivors to gain access to outside world. As a result, the SPDC banned the present moment and use of communication equipments unless obtaind from the government, at a price of $1,500 per phone. Each agency was allowed purchase a maximum of ten phones. Furthermore, the SPDC did not allow aid agencies to import vehicles or machinery from abroad either. An offer by the British government to provide t he SPDC with equipment crownable of unloading planes faster was turned down. As a result, because of these policies adopted by the SPDC, the delivery of aid was not and slow and slow up but huge quantities of relief supplies ended up in Yangon warehouses as confiscated items instead of creation delivered to the victims. (ALTSEAN 2008)An opposite study criticism of SPDC domestic policies was the fact that they conducted the constitutional referendum despite the cyclone disaster. The purpose of the election was to legitimize the authority of the junta. As a result they went ahead with the elections amidst widespread disapproval. Even though, the junta postponed the referendum in the cyclone affected areas they went ahead with the elections the in other regions (Selth 2008). Consequently, the SPDC had to commit the expressage resources it had to the referendum which deviate the much take attention away from delivering aid to those affected by the cyclone. In addition the SPDC fo rcefully evicted many of the survivors from both government and unofficial shelters for the purpose of conducting the referendum. For example, the SPDC evicted around 90 people from a hall in Yangon so that the hall could be used as a polling topographic point (Amnesty International 2008).Therefore, international politics combined with domestic policies ensured that the delivery of aid for the victims of Nargis was not an easy matter. To complicate things further the international community set about certain bread and butter issues as well. The succeeding(prenominal) section of the paper takes a closer look at those issues.International Funding IssuesAside from the onsite hindrances of delivering aid the international aid agencies had issues related to raising adequate funds. During the initial want response the World Food programme (WFP) estimated that the daily aid delivered to the victims was only one third of the required amount (ALTSEAN 2008). A year by and by half a mil lion people are serene without good housing and 350,000 people require food donations from the World Food Program (Solomon 2009).The original Myanmar Cyclone Flash Appeal had requested for 187.3 million dollars for the rebuilding effort. However, after a more comprehensive assessment of the affected area and the victims a revised Flash Appeal requesting $481 million was launched (UN 2008). Unfortunately, during the requisite phase of the operation, international aid agencies were able to raise only 66 percent of that amount. Similarly, of the nearly $700 million required for the three years Post-Nargis Recovery and Preparedness platform (PONREPP), initiated by the SPDC in association with ASEAN and the UN, only $100 million had been sworn by donor countries (Mungpi 2009). The lack of adequate patronage drastically cut down the rate at which aid was organism delivered to those in need.Despite the self-explanatory need for additional funding, international aid agencies were una ble to accumulate funding the way in which they did during the 2004 Asian Tsunami. One of the major reasons for this was the reluctance of governments to provide additional funding to military junta. They feared that their donations were being diverted away from the victims and were being used to strengthen the military regime instead. Such fears were reaffirmed by evidence of aid being stolen and redirected by the SPDC. For example, the first two WFP planes carrying food into Myanmar were seized by the government upon arrival. The WFP responded by suspending their flights to Myanmar, however, in light of the extent of the humanitarian crisis the WFP completed that they had to resume the flights and send aid irrespective of fact that it might tucker out sized again. In addition there were reports of incidents where the victims being made to conciliate for the relief items. In some cases the government agents forced the survivors to vote Yes in the referendum before giving them t heir aid supplies. Survivors were also reportedly given rotten, low quality food instead of the nutrition-rich biscuits that the international donors had sent. Instead, these items ended up being sold in the markets along with the rice and oil donated by international organizations. To counter these accusations SPDC issued a warning to take legal action against anyone caught steal relief supplies. However, the threat never materialized, and as a result reports of stolen and lacking(p) aid continued to appear, which further discouraged international donors and caused additional funding issues for the aid agencies. (ALTSEAN 2008)The implementation of the human rights systemAccording to an international system of human rights, in the event of a natural disaster, every mortal has the right to be given protection from natural hazards, evacuate if necessary and be given access to adequate quantities of food, shelter, and medicine. It is the national authoritys responsibility to provide these services however, in cases where the authority is either unable or slow to provide these services the international community has a humanitarian engagement to deliver the aid instead (Caritas 2008). It was this system of human rights that was used by the international community to aid the victims of Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar. Facing numerous previously mentioned SPDC created obstacles the UN humans Rights Council adopted a resolution on June 18 objurgate the continued violation of the rights of the cyclone survivors. The resolution demanded that the SPDC allow aid workers immediate, full and unre labour access to the Irrawaddy delta and stop forcing the survivors to retort to their cyclone affected village homes where access to emergency relief was inadequate. (Akimoto 2008)However, a year later international relief workers still find it difficult to get visas for Myanmar. Those that do get the in are only allowed a limited rate of flow of time to work in the Irrawad dy delta (Solomon 2009). Furthermore, since declaring the end of the rescue and relief phase of the cyclone Nargis response on 20 May 2008 the SPDC ordered increasing reckon of traumatized cyclone victims to return to their homes despite the fact that they no to access to food, shelter or other aid supplies in those villages (Amnesty International 2008). Therefore, even though it was through the human rights system that the international community was able to provide assistance to the survivors, the domestic policies adopted by the military junta greatly diminished the effectiveness of its application.Many of these domestic policies that hindered the delivery of aid to the victims of the cyclone resulted from certain ethnical beliefs that the military junta has. The next section of the paper takes a look at some of these pagan issues that pack made delivering aid difficult.Cultural IssuesOne of the major cultural issues that made the process of restoring the Irrawaddy delta imme nsely difficult is rooted in the isolationistic principles of the military junta. Since the 1960s the government of Myanmar endorsed a self- reliance doctrine where they believed that their nation and citizens would do better if left on their own. Consequently they avoided accepting assistance from abroad even if caused more hardships (Belanger and Horsey 2008 2). This belief was a major divisor behind the initial denial of international assistance.This tradition of self reliance also resulted in the survivors being prematurely sent back to their cyclone devastated homes. fair(a) after a month after the cyclone, the government declared that the survivors had to return to their villages and resume their way of living. According to the SPDC, cyclone victims would otherwise become too pendant on relief from international donors and not be productive becoming to support themselves. In some cases, the government forcibly evicted people from their shelters and sent them back to their villages by the use of force. In Yangon, for example, the military reportedly menace to shoot those that would not return to their villages. (Shwe 2008)Another major cultural issue within Myanmar stems from the fact it is a multi-ethnic country with several groups in conflict with one another. Even the delta region is home to a moment of different ethnic groups with the Bamar being the dominant group in the region followed by the Karen and then the Rakhaing. As a result the international aid agencies had to ensure that no particular ethnic group was given prejudiced treatment or overlooked during the operation. Otherwise intergroup tensions worsened the already strained relations between the various ethnic groups. On the other draw aid through an equitable and non-sectarian delivery of aid the aid agencies were able to make different groups together. (TCG 2008)Environmental IssuesEnvironmental issues also presented themselves as factors that needed to be considered by the aid a gencies. Due to the constipations caused by the cyclone the local anesthetic environment in the Irrawaddy delta created severe wellness issues for the survivors. The contamination of the ponds and lakes, used by villagers as drinking water, with sea water and dead bodies spread breakbone fever fever, diarrhea and dysentery across the region. Despite efforts by the government and international checkup groups the damage done to the local environment, continued to create serious health concerns for the survivors. (Shwe 2008)Aside from causing physical harm, environmental damages placed a severe strain on the economic wellbeing of an already free society. The fact that the majority of the victims of Nargis belonged to arcadian societies they relied on agriculture as their chief(prenominal) source of income. In addition the delta region also produced a major portion of the countries of food supply. Therefore, the destruction of the agricultural sector meant that not only were the re sidents of the Irrawaddy to suffer severe economic hardships, but the entire country would have food shortages for several years unless the aid agencies addressed the issue. Therefore, the rehabilitation of the region, expect to cost $11 billion, remains a top priority for aid agencies (TCG 2008)A third environment related issue is associated with the loss of the mangrove forests in the region. The spread of shrimp farms and rice paddies for over a period of ten years resulted in the loss of significant portion of the mangrove covering. The presence of the mangrove forest would have reduced the extent of the damage caused by Nargis (TCG 2008). Consequently the IUCN suggested that once the emergency aid had been provided, the government and other organizations needed to restore the mangrove forest and other coastal ecosystem in order to avoid future devastations caused by cyclones. (IUCN 2008)Gender IssuesAccording to a report published by the TCG, 61 percent of those that died in th e cyclone were women, with the number being even higher in certain villages. Furthermore, the majority of the women that died were aged between the 18-60 years, the age group that is the most the productive and reproductive. Therefore, the cyclone created a sex imbalance in the delta region which in turn created several issues for the aid agencies (TCG 2008). This section of the paper takes a look at some of the gender issues created by Nargis, particularly the ones related to division of labor, migration of women into cities and the overall difference in needs of men and women in the aftermath of a natural disaster.First of all Nargis caused a shift in the division of labor among men and women. The death of the female members of the household meant that the men had to take on responsibilities that were traditionally reserved for women, such as cooking and childcare. Similarly, in families where the men died women had to take on the responsibility of earning money in addition to th eir previous roles. As a result it created additional burden for the widows and widowers and prevented them from performing other duties and as such had to be treated as among the most vulnerable groups in the community (TCG 2009)Another gender related issue created by the cyclone involves women migrating from the rural sectors to the urban regions. The devastation to the region that Nargis caused left unmarried women with very limited opportunities to earn a living. As a result many were prompted to leave of absence their villages and look for work in the city. Once in the city, these women, with no experience of life outside their village, became easy targets for exploitation, forced labor, prostitution and trafficking. (TCG 2008)Finally aid agencies had to implement different aid mechanisms for the men and women of the delta region who experienced the natural disaster in different ways and as such needed to be looked upon as separate interest groups with specific needs, limitati ons and abilities. Due to cultural and social restrictions women, comparatively, have fewer opportunities to meliorate their conditions on their own. As a result the aid agencies, helping women recover, needed to provide services that allowed women to improve their ability to participate in activities and decision making processes. (TCG 2008)ConclusionTherefore, it can be seen from this paper that the delivery of aid to a country devastated by a natural disaster requires the consideration of a variety of factors. In the case of Nargis wrecking the Irrawaddy delta in Myanmar, the international community had to deal with a military government intent on hindering the aid effort. afterward having convinced the SPDC to let international aid workers enter Myanmar the aid agencies face additional difficulties due to the domestic policies. Moreover, with the junta diverting and stealing aid the availability of international funds became an issue as well.Despite, having had used the inter national system of human rights to initiate the delivery of aid to the affected groups, the overall international response was not as effective in preventing the violation of the survivors human rights. Cultural, environmental and gender issues inside the Irrawaddy delta complicated matters further illustrating the complexness of the delivering aid to an isolated developing country struggling to cope with a natural disaster.ReferenceAkimoto, Y. 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